Second Amendment Update: Defendant Challenges Laws Disarming Unlawful Drug Users and Those Under Pretrial Indictment
Robert Phillips
Robert Phillips
  • Ref # CAB10110
  • November 19, 2025

Second Amendment Update: Defendant Challenges Laws Disarming Unlawful Drug Users and Those Under Pretrial Indictment

Second Amendment Update 
By Robert Phillips  
Deputy District Attorney (ret.) 

Legal Issues 

  • Possession of a Firearm by Unlawful Drug User, per 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) 
  • Possession of a Firearm by Pretrial Person Under Indictment, per 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) 

A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals federal ruling upheld the constitutionality of gun laws applying the mandate that a court must consider the Second Amendment’s historical precedent, as determined by the Supreme Court’s landmark decision New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1.  

The Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Stennerson (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2025) 150 F.4th 1276, involved an admitted meth addict by the name of Jaren Michael Stennerson. Stennerson got popped twice in the span of 2½ years, first in August 2019, when he was found in possession of methamphetamine and syringes. Stennerson admitted to the officers that he had the syringes because he was addicted to methamphetamine. He was charged in Montana state court with felony drug possession, and while his case was still pending, he was arrested again, this time in possession of a stolen firearm.  

Stennerson said he was in the habit of using a “shot” of methamphetamine on a daily basis. This time, he was indicted in federal court, where it was alleged that he possessed a firearm as an unlawful drug user, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), and the illegal receipt of a firearm by a person under indictment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(n).  

Stennerson challenged the constitutionality of both statutes, arguing that the Second Amendment right to bear arms protected his right to possess a firearm under the circumstances as alleged. Specifically, he moved to dismiss his federal indictment, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and § 922(n) both facially violated the Second Amendment. He also alleged that § 922(g)(3) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. The district (trial) court denied Stennerson’s motions. 

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that on its face, the Second Amendment does presumptively protect Stennerson’s right to possess firearms. However, this presumption can be overcome by historical precedent, as dictated by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, supra. The court said historical laws restricting intoxicated individuals from possessing firearms provide a sufficient analogous tradition to support the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), at least in some applications. Stennerson’s admitted daily methamphetamine use clearly placed him within section 922(g)(3)’s prohibition, providing sufficient notice to him that his possession of firearm while using drugs was illegal.  Similarly, the Court held that historical practices of disarming pretrial detainees support 18 U.S.C. § 922(n)’s constitutionality, especially since it imposes a lesser burden than complete disarmament.  More specifically, the Court held that 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(n), prohibiting receipt of firearms by persons under felony indictment, is facially constitutional because founding-era practices of disarming pretrial detainees provide sufficient historical support for at least some applications of the statute.  As such, the district court did not err by denying Stennerson’s motions to dismiss.  ’s prohibition, providing sufficient notice to him that his possession of firearm while using drugs was illegal.  

Similarly, the court held that historical practices of disarming pretrial detainees supports 18 U.S.C. § 922(n)’s constitutionality, since it imposes a lesser burden than complete disarmament. More specifically, the court held that 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(n), which prohibits the receipt of firearms by those under felony indictment, is facially constitutional because founding-era practices of disarming pretrial detainees provide sufficient historical support for at least some applications of the statute. As such, it ruled that the district court did not err by denying Stennerson’s motions to dismiss.  

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