Interpreting the Unambiguous Invocation
  • Ref # CAB00102
  • December 01, 2016

Interpreting the Unambiguous Invocation

Interpreting the Unambiguous Invocation

Robert C. Phillips
DDA; retired
December, 2016

            It has long been one of Miranda v. Arizona’s[1] principle tenants that once an in-custody suspect invokes his right to silence (e.g., “I don’t want to talk.”), law enforcement officers are to “scrupulously honor” his wishes and immediately terminate an interrogation.[2]  From this basic concept has developed the rule that such a suspect cannot beat around the bush when invoking.  It is his obligation in attempting to invoke to make his desires clear and unequivocal.[3]  Although this rule applied at one time only to attempts to invoke one’s right to the assistance of counsel, it is now recognized that the same rule applies as well when invoking one’s right to remain silent.[4]

            Deciphering the meaning of a suspect’s attempt to invoke, as to what he really intended to say, has become the problem.  In seeking to resolve this issue under the unique facts of any particular case, we are told that “(a) suspect need only invoke his rights ‘sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be [such] a request.’”[5]  While the courts have told us that an invocation of a suspect’s right to remain silent, for instance, need not be express; that it may be implied under the circumstances, and that any words or conduct reasonably inconsistent with a present willingness to discuss the case freely and completely is enough,© 2026 Legal Updates, LLC.
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