Hot Pursuit of a Misdemeanor Suspect into a Residence – Caution is in Order  
By Ray Hill, Professor Emeritus 
Santa Rosa Junior College 

Thank you to Jake Junge of Whittier Police Department for his question that prompted this article. 

In discussing this issue, I have referenced several case decisions outlined in Bob Phillips’ “The Fourth Amendment – Search and Seizure – An Update,” 25th Edition, February 2025, available to Pro Subscribers). 

As you will see, some case decisions are conflicting, and the explanation of exigency is not fully defined. 

In 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the Fourth Amendment landscape in this area in Lange v. California (2021) 594 U.S. 295. In this unanimous decision, the court held that the hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not always or categorically qualify as an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless entry into a home. Such entries must be judged on a case-by-case basis and whether there are further exigent circumstances excusing the general warrant requirement for a residential entry.  

The circumstance in Lange were as follows: 

 A CHP officer initiated a traffic stop on Lange’s vehicle for a loud music violation and repeatedly honking his horn. When the officer turned on emergency lights, Lange drove another 100 feet into the driveway of his Sonoma Valley home and parked inside the garage. The officer exited his vehicle, prevented Lange from closing the garage door, entered the garage and began questioning. Lange displayed symptoms of intoxication, failed field sobriety tests and was arrested for DUI.  

The court ruled in making such a residential entry, an officer must consider all the circumstances involving “hot pursuit” prior to making such an entry (nature of the violation, nature of flight or evasion, risk of escape, destruction of evidence, harm to others).  

In this case, there was no evidence of evasion or flight or that Lange even knew the officer was following him. There was a very brief period between the time when the officer activated the red lights and when Lange pulled into his driveway. Any failure to yield was negligible. Entry into the garage to conduct further investigation was unlawful. 

Chief Justice John Roberts’ concurring opinion raised concerns about the ruling’s implications for law enforcement. He described a scenario: 

“Suppose a police officer on patrol responds to a report of a man assaulting a teenager. Arriving at the scene, the officer sees the teenager vainly trying to ward off the assailant. The officer attempts to place the assailant under arrest, but he takes off on foot. He leads the officer on a chase over several blocks as the officer yells for him to stop. With the officer closing in, the suspect leaps over a fence and then stands in a home’s front yard. He claims it’s his home and tells the officer to stay away. What is the officer to do? The court requires that the officer: (1) Stop and consider whether the suspect – if apprehended – would be charged with a misdemeanor or a felony; (2) Tally up other “exigencies” that might be present or arise and (3) Decide whether he can complete the arrest or must instead seek a warrant – one that, in all likelihood, will not arrive for hours. Meanwhile, the suspect may stroll into the home and then dash out the back door. Or, for all the officer knows, get a gun and take aim from inside.” 

We have an exigency-based California Supreme Court case dealing with DUIs (Peo. v. Thompson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811). Here, the court ruled that entering a house without consent to take a suspected DUI driver into custody, to remove him from the house for identification and arrest by a private citizen who saw defendant’s driving, and to preserve evidence of his blood-alcohol level was lawful. The facts of the Thompson case were as follows: 

A citizen found Thompson, the defendant, “passed out” inside a Ford Bronco in her parking space. He awoke, was visibly intoxicated, threw an empty vodka bottle out of the car window and drove away. The citizen followed in her car and called 911. She reported that he ran a red light, was weaving, ran several stop signs, and was driving too fast for conditions in neighborhoods where children were present.  

Santa Barbara Police officers traced the Bronco’s registration to the defendant’s residence. The Bronco was parked outside the home with the hood still warm. The reporting citizen identified the vehicle. Officers knocked at the front door. Thompson’s landlord answered the door. She said the vehicle belonged to “Daniel” (the defendant) and she would summon him. She refused to allow officers to enter the house. She returned telling officers that he was asleep. 

Through the open door, officers could see Thompson (as described by the citizen) walking in the hallway, moving toward the rear of the house and away from officers. Officers told him to come to the front door. Thompson stopped about seven feet away. He exhibited difficulty in balance and slurred speech. Officers told him to come outside. He told officers he didn’t want to talk, turned, and again began walking toward the rear of the house.  

Officers entered the house, seized him and took him outside where he was identified by the reporting citizen. His B.A.C. test revealed a .21. The court ruled the imminent destruction of evidence is an exigency permitting a warrantless entry into a home. Thompson’s blood-alcohol could have burned off during the time it would have taken police to seek an arrest warrant and the defendant could have changed his B.A. level by ingesting more alcohol. 

Note: Officers can make an “outside presence” misdemeanor arrest in DUI cases when “the person may destroy or conceal evidence of the crime unless immediately arrested” (40300.5(e) Vehicle Code). 

See also People v. Hampton (1985) 164 Cal.App.3rd 27. A warrantless entry was upheld to prevent the destruction of evidence (the blood-alcohol level) and there was reason to believe the defendant intended to resume driving. 

The 9th USCA has taken a different stance on this issue, generally finding that a fleeing suspect is immune from residential arrest, at least when the suspected offense is only a misdemeanor, irrespective of the likelihood that evidence may disappear in the process. The commission of a misdemeanor “will seldom, if ever, justify a warrantless entry into the home.” It ruled that California’s interpretation under Thompson was incorrect (Hopkins v. Bonvicino (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F. 3rd 752).  

Note: There was no further explanation of what “seldom” would mean with respect to a lawful misdemeanor pursuit. 

However, a federal ruling in Stanton v. Sims (2013) 421 U.S. 7 determined the Hopkins decision was incorrect, at least with respect to civil liability. The facts of Stanton were as follows: 

Officer Stanton and his partner responded to a call about a disturbance involving a person with a baseball bat. Stanton was familiar with the La Mesa neighborhood, known for gang violence. The officers, wearing uniforms and driving a marked police vehicle, approached the location and noticed men walking in the street. Seeing the police car, two men turned into an apartment complex. Patrick Sims (the plaintiff) crossed the street about 25 yards in front of Stanton’s car and ran toward a residence.  

Stanton did not see a baseball bat, but considered Sims’ behavior suspicious and decided to investigate. Stanton exited his car, called out “police,” and ordered Sims to stop. Sims did not stop, but “looked directly at Stanton” and went through the gate of the six-foot wooden fence enclosing the front yard. Stanton believed that Sims had committed a jailable misdemeanor by disobeying his order (148 P.C.), “fear[ed] for [his] safety” and made the “split-second decision” to kick open the gate. Sims was behind the gate when it flew open, striking and injuring Sims.  

Sims sued under 42 U. S. C. 1983. 9USCA held that Stanton’s warrantless entry was unconstitutional because Sims had the same expectation of privacy in the curtilage of the home as in the home itself, there was no immediate danger and Sims had committed only a minor offense. The pursuit did not justify warrantless entry and Officer Stanton was not entitled to qualified immunity.  

In federal court, the decision was reversed, noting that courts nationwide are divided on whether an officer with probable cause to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may enter a home without a warrant while in hot pursuit of that suspect. The Ninth Circuit read “too broadly” Supreme Court precedent (Lange) that did not involve hot pursuit. The court did not determine whether Stanton’s entry was constitutional. Stanton may have been mistaken in believing his actions were justified, but was not “plainly incompetent” and was eligible for qualified immunity from civil action. 

Summary: 

As reported in the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office “Point of View – Recent Case Reports,” Deputy District Attorney Mark Hutchins wrote: “Based on the facts in Thompson, we think an entry should be upheld if both of the following circumstances existed:”  

(1) Time lapse: The time lapse between the suspect’s driving and the officers’ entry was not so great as to render the blood-alcohol results virtually irrelevant.  

(2) Manner of entry: The officers did not enter in an unreasonably intrusive manner. In making this determination, the following circumstances would be relevant:  

• Forcible entry: Did the officers force their way into the house; e.g., break down the door   

• Knock-notice: If the officers made a forcible entry, did they comply with the knock-notice requirements   

• Search: Did the officers conduct a search of the premises  

The P.O.S.T. Basic Course Student Workbook, L.D. 16 (4.8.10 - May 2025) Chapter Four, Exigent Circumstances Searches, 3-28 reads: “In a case where a law enforcement officer is in hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect, the decision to conduct a warrantless entry must be judged on a case-by-case basis and meet the standard of exigency. Pursuant to Lange v. California, the Supreme Court has ruled that beyond the mere flight of a suspect in the course of a misdemeanor, the officer must identify additional exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry.” 

A final word from our Fourth Amendment guru, Bob Phillips: “The potential destruction of evidence (even if that evidence is only the subject's blood-alcohol level) is commonly the stated justification for chasing suspect into his house. Absent this destruction of evidence justification, we probably would not be allowed to chase the subject into his home, and probably not even into the curtilage of his home, at least where the suspected offense is only a misdemeanor.” 

This remains a complex and evolving area of Fourth Amendment law. Officers are advised to 

• Carefully assess whether additional exigencies exist beyond mere flight. 

• Document observations and consider alternatives (e.g., containment, seeking a warrant). 

• Act consistently with department policy, training, and legal counsel advice. 

Agencies are encouraged to consult with their legal advisors as further case law develops in this area. 

Stay Safe – RH