By Robert Phillips, Deputy District Attorney (Ret)

Citizen Complaints Against Law Enforcement Officers and the Making of False Complaints, per Pen. Code § 148.6(a), and the First Amendment:   

The California Supreme Court just published a landmark case decision dealing with the constitutionality of Penal Code § 148.6(a)’s requirement that private citizens who wish to file a so-called “citizen’s complaint” against a peace officer, complaining of police misconduct, must first read an admonishment and acknowledge (by signing) the fact that the act of knowingly filing a false complaint alleging police misconduct constitutes a misdemeanor. (P.C. § 148.6, subd. (a)(2))  

Pen. Code § 148.6(a)(2), in effect, prohibits law enforcement from accepting an official claim of misconduct unless the complainant reads and signs an admonition, which must be written in bold printed capital letters, warning the citizen (in addition to the citizen’s right to file such a complaint) that: “IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO MAKE A COMPLAINT THAT YOU KNOW TO BE FALSE. IF YOU MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAINST AN OFFICER KNOWING THAT IT IS FALSE, YOU CAN BE PROSECUTED.” 

The case is Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (Nov. 10, 2025) __ Cal.5th __ [2025 Cal. LEXIS 7261].  The issue presented in this case is whether Pen. Code § 148.6(a)’s provisions violate the complaining citizen’s First Amendment constitutional free speech rights. In a LONG (90 page) decision, the majority of the Court (6-to-1) ultimately concludes that 148.6(a)(2)’s requirements do in fact violate the First Amendment. 

California’s Supreme Court has previously considered this issue.  (See People v. Stanistreet (2002) 29 Cal.4th 497.)  In Stanistreet, the Court ruled that Pen. Code § 148.6(a)(2)’s requirements do not violate the First Amendment. Since then, however, a number of federal courts have ruled to the contrary, holding that section 148.6(a) (or its equivalent) does in fact violate the First Amendment. (See Chaker v. Crogan (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 1215; Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino (C.D.Cal. 2004) 325 F.Supp.2nd 1087, 1091; and Eakins v. Nevada (D.Nev. 2002) 219 F.Supp.2nd 1113; striking down a similar Nevada law.)  

In the wake of these federal decisions, the City of Los Angeles entered into a consent decree which in effect barred it from requiring complainants to acknowledge and sign the advisory described in Pen. Code § 148.6(a)(2). Although this consent decree was only good for two years, expiring in 2013, Los Angeles continued to waive the requirement that a complainant comply with Pen. Code § 148.6(a)(2)’s requirements.  However, in 2017, the Los Angeles Police Protective League filed this current civil action seeking an injunction that would require the City of L.A. to comply with section 148.6(a)(2)’s requirements. Relying on the reasoning of the federal authorities cited above, the City argued that section 148.6(a) was an unconstitutional regulation of free speech, in violation of the First Amendment. 

From here the Supreme Court goes into a deep dive discussing First Amendment jurisprudence, examining in excruciating detail a number of U.S. Supreme Court decisions (e.g., see  R. A. V. v. St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377.) as well as California’s Stanistreet case.  Ultimately, the Court concluded that Pen. Code § 148.6(a)’s criminal punishment provision (P.C. § 148.6(a)(1)), as well as its accompanying admonition requirement (P.C. § 148.6(a)(2)), by merely threatening the mere possibility of being criminally prosecuted for filing a false complaint, “exhibit numerous characteristics that, considered together, sufficiently burden a protected form of speech—namely, truthful (or at least well-intentioned) complaints of police misconduct—so as to warrant heightened constitutional scrutiny.”  As such, the Court found that these requirements “threaten censorship of ideas . . . by deterring citizens from filing truthful (or at least not knowingly false) complaints of misconduct.”  As such, the majority of the Court ultimately held that these statutory requirements do in fact violate the First Amendment and, as such, are unenforceable.  

Interestingly enough, Associate Justice Goodwin H. Liu (whose intellectual and well-reasoned opinions should never be ignored) dissents from the majority (adding another 25 pages to the decision).  In so doing, he notes that; “(s)ection 148.6 is no more unconstitutional than laws that make it a crime to commit perjury, file a false police report, submit a false document to a public agency, or lie to a government official concerning an official matter. Such laws ‘protect the integrity of [g]overnment processes, quite apart from merely restricting false speech.’” (Citing United States. v. Alvarez (2012) 567 U.S. 709, 721.) . . . “They belong to one of the ‘historic and traditional categories [of expression]’ where ‘content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted.’” . . .  (Id. at p. 717.)  Justice Liu continues on, noting that; “(t)oday’s opinion invalidates section 148.6 on the ground that it ‘deter[s] citizens from filing truthful (or at least not knowingly false) complaints of police misconduct.’ (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)” Thus, in Justice Liu’s opinion: “(T)hat rationale rests on speculative assertions and does not withstand scrutiny.” 

However, with six justices disagreeing with Justice Liu, the bottom line is that enforcement of Pen. Code § 148.6 is now unconstitutional.  In other words, a law enforcement agency cannot threaten any citizen wishing to file a complaint against a peace officer with criminal prosecution even if the complaint is knowingly false.  As such, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

**Special Attention Internal Affairs, Administration and Risk Managers.**

Read the full case decision here.