• Roadblocks as a Use-of-Force Issue
• Roadblocks and Fourth Amendment Seizures of the Person

A roadblock used to stop a fleeing motorist (or bicyclist) constitutes a use of force and a Fourth Amendment seizure.  Depending upon an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, using a roadblock in such a manner may or may not involve an excessive use of force and a Fourth Amendment violation.

Preston Seidner was riding his bicycle on a well-lit Arizona residential street (they don’t say what city) at just before midnight in February, 2020.  Seidner’s bike didn’t have a front light; a violation of Arizona law (Revised Statute § 28-816(A)).  Patrol Officer Jonathan de Vries, observing this violation, pulled ahead of Seidner to confirm that there was no headlight.  The officer then stopped ahead of Seidner and activated his marked patrol vehicle’s overhead lights.  As the officer started to get out of his car expecting to contact the bike’s rider, Seidner ignored him and went right on by.  Officer de Vries jumped back into his patrol car and initiated a 15-mph pursuit as Seidner put the pedal to the metal (so to speak), and continued to flee.  Officer de Vries eventually accelerated ahead of Seidner and turned his patrol car at an angle across the street into Seidner’s path, and stopped.  Seconds later, as Officer de Vries started to open his door, Seidner crashed into the side of the patrol car.  As Seidner laid on the ground moaning from his injuries (a dislocated wrist and a sprained forearm), and having hit his head and chest in the impact, Officer de Vries handcuffed him.  As he did so, the officer asked Seidner why he didn’t stop, to which Seidner could only say that he was “scared.”  He also confessed that his bicycle’s brakes didn’t work. Seidner later sued Officer de Vries in federal court under authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Eighth (cruel and unusual punishment) and Fourteenth (due process) Amendment violations.  Construing Seidner’s allegations as more correctly a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, the federal district (trial) court denied the officer’s motion for summary judgment and ruled that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity.  Officer de Vries appealed.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part.  First off, the Court “easily conclude(d) that de Vries’s use of his patrol car to stop Seidner from fleeing was a (Fourth Amendment) seizure.”  That’s never been an issue.  The issue here was whether, under the circumstances of this case, Officer de Vries’ seizure of Seidner, and the degree of force used in effecting that seizure, was “objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [hi]m.” (Williamson v. City of National City (9th Cir. 2022) 23 F.4th 1146, 1151.)  In examining this issue, a court is to consider three factors: (1) The severity of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights by evaluating the type and amount of force inflicted; (2) the government’s interest in the use of force; and (3) the balance between the gravity of the intrusion on the individual and the government’s need for that intrusion.  (Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386.)  In reviewing these factors as they pertain to this case, and while characterizing the use of the officer’s car to stop Seidner from fleeing as a “roadblock,” the Court reviewed prior roadblock cases, noting that “roadblocks are a type of force that must be quantified in reference to the surrounding circumstances.”  For instance, using a roadblock to stop a motorcycle fleeing at speeds of up to 100 mph, where the fleeing suspects crashed into a patrol car causing “severe and permanent” injuries to the bike riders, was characterized by the reviewing court under those circumstances as “deadly force.”  (Buckner v. Kilgore (6th Cir. 1994) 36 F.3rd 536.)  However, a roadblock “brightly illuminated and located at the end of a long straightaway” that the suspect could have avoided hitting if the brakes on his vehicle were working properly was held not to be deadly force. (Seekamp v. Michaud (1st Cir. 1997) 109 F.3rd 802.)  In yet another case, a partial roadblock created to stop a fleeing motorcyclist traveling at high speeds that caused an “unavoidable” collision was held to be an unreasonable use of force.  (Hawkins v. City of Farmington (8th Cir. 1999) 189 F.3rd 695, 698-702.)  And lastly, a so-called “rolling roadblock,” where several police vehicles “surrounded” the suspect’s fleeing vehicle, began braking, and stopped the suspect’s vehicle with a “low-impact collision,” was characterized as “de minimis force.”  (Tucker v. McCormack (M.D. Tenn. 2010), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94157.) Once the degree of the force used in any particular case is so quantified, the issue becomes whether the use of that force was reasonable under the then-existing circumstances.  In this case, the Court accepted Seidner’s allegation (as it must when appealed by the civil defendant) that Officer de Vries did not pull over in front of him far enough ahead to allow Seidner the opportunity to stop before hitting the patrol car.  However, in this case, the Court felt that even if Seidner could not fully stop before hitting the patrol car, it was reasonable for de Vries to expect that Seidner could still react to the situation by slowing down, turning, or taking other measures to minimize any impact (noting that the officer was not responsible for Seidner’s defective brakes, having no way to know that).  Also, Seidner was traveling at a relatively slow speed (15 mph), and de Varies patrol car was in view through most if not all of the immediately preceding chase.  Based upon this, the Court concluded that the roadblock that de Vries created in this case is an example of force that is “capable of inflicting significant pain and causing serious injury,” which the Court in previous cases has characterized as “intermediate force.” 

But we’re not done.  In reviewing the second Graham factor (i.e., “governmental interest”), a court must consider three more sub-factors (if you will); (1) “how severe the crime at issue was,” (2) “whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and (3) “whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”  These factors are not necessarily exclusive and must be considered under the “totality of circumstances,” including whether “less intrusive alternatives” were available to law enforcement and whether the suspect was given “proper warnings” before force was used.  In that the initial stop in this case was based upon a traffic offense only, the Court noted that it did not become relatively serious until Seidner attempted to pedal away and evade contact with Officer de Vries. Even so, the Court inferred that the offenses at issue were relatively non-serious.  Secondly, a factor strongly favoring Seidner, he never posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others.  The third factor (“attempting to evade arrest”) favored the use of some degree of force.  Upon determining that there was no “less intrusive alternative” available, the Court concluded “that the government did have an interest justifying some use of force to stop Seidner from fleeing even though the incident initially arose from a minor traffic violation.” 

After having expended all the ink it took to balance these confusing and interrelated factors, the Court finally noted that “the ultimate question of reasonableness is not properly decided as a matter of law. . . . [R]easonableness is often a question for the jury.”  For that reason, the Court upheld the district court’s denial of de Varies’ motion for summary judgment, finding that a jury was better suited to make this call.  But the Court then reversed the district court’s ruling on the issue of “qualified immunity,” ruling that contrary to the district court’s conclusions, the rules on the issue of what constitutes reasonable force in the use of a roadblock were not sufficiently settled in the law (i.e., via prior cases) so as to provide Officer de Varies with sufficient notice as to what he could legally do or not do under the Fourth Amendment.  The Court therefore ruled that the lawsuit must be dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. 

So why did the Court take so much time and effort talking about Fourth Amendment use-of-force principles as they relate to roadblocks if it ultimately was only going to dismiss the case on qualified immunity grounds?  The answer to that is simple:  Because of this new case, you’re now on notice as to what the rules are (as confusing as they may be).  Now that the rules have been sufficiently spelled out for you, the next time you’re confronted with the need to set up a roadblock in an emergency situation, you’re expected to know what must be done to effectively and safely employ such a roadblock.  So what then, after this long and confusing dissertation, is it you need to know about roadblocks as they relate to Fourth Amendment use of force principles?

The answer to this question is also simple (even if difficult to apply in the real world).  In a nutshell, you need to do everything you possibly can to minimize the likelihood of injury to your fleeing suspect, or to anyone else.  For instance, setting up a roadblock around a blind curve in a high speed situation where the suspect may not have a reasonable opportunity to stop will likely get you sued.  Setting up that roadblock where he can see it without having to crash into it will likely protect you from a lawsuit.  The fact that giving a fleeing suspect enough notice as to an upcoming roadblock may offer him the opportunity to avoid it altogether and escape via a detour seems to be irrelevant to the Court.  But that wasn’t in issue in this case.  In summary, all I can tell you is that the Court expects you to do all you can to minimize the possibility of serious injury while hopefully still being able to stop and take the sucker into custody.  Figuring out how to do that is why you get paid the big bucks.